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SHIFTING CONSTITUTIONAL SANDS: 
CAN AND SHOULD PATENTHOLDERS RELY ON 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE TO THWART 
GOVERNMENT ACTION? 
DAVIDA H. ISAACS∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Today there are more patentholders than ever who may seek relief 
when government action detrimentally affects the value of their pat-
ents. The expected explosion in patentholders’ due process claims cre-
ates a danger of enjoining government policy changes or crucial gov-
ernment use. Historically, courts have characterized patents as “prop-
erty” and thus accorded them protection under the Takings and Due 
Process Clauses. But patents are not a form of traditional property; 
rather, they are federally granted benefits. In light of the Federal Cir-
cuit’s recent repudiation of patentholders’ rights to Takings Clause 
protection, and the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, it is fair to 
say that courts are no longer reflexively granting patentholders prop-
erty protection. If the courts choose to reconsider that protection, it 
would make sense for them to analyze patentholders’ rights to such 
protection using the same test that is used to determine the due proc-
ess rights of recipients of other government benefits.  
 Applying this same standard, there is substantial doubt as to 
whether patents satisfy the requirements for due process protection. 
Patents have some—but not all—of the characteristics of a protectible 
federal benefit. Unlike other federal benefits previously awarded pro-
tection, patents do not have an easily discernible value, because the 
value of each patent is dependent on the market for the patented tech-
nology. Moreover, because patents, unlike welfare, do not furnish ba-
sic living requirements, they do not fall within the realm of “essential” 
federal benefits. Thus, patentholders should be aware that if this 
standard is applied, there is some doubt that they will be entitled to 
due process protection. 
 Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s recent hesitation to accord patents 
full property status is easily understood in light of the potential im-
pact for providing incumbent protections. Recognizing a paten-
tholder’s right to due process protection could have a dramatic effect 
on government activities. Government action, either in the form of ap-
propriation of an invention or in the form of legislation, may be sus-
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ceptible to either injunctive or monetary relief. If unlicensed use of an 
invention is found to violate due process, the government may find its 
use enjoined, possibly making some of its most important government 
functions more costly or complicated. Similarly, the government may 
find the patentholders successful in either enjoining retroactive legis-
lation, or obtaining damages up to the value of the patentholders’ eco-
nomic loss—damages that, but for currently proposed legislation, 
could be as high as $1 billion dollars. If courts hesitate to accede to 
these potential outcomes, they could choose to reverse course and deny 
patentholders that particular protection. 
 In sum, while patentholders might view their right to due process 
protection as firmly established, the Federal Circuit’s recent decision 
should give them pause. In circumstances involving government use of 
inventions or government policy changes, patentholders bringing such 
claims should expect caution from the courts in reaffirming their right 
to due process protection. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In late 2001, several anthrax-tainted letters were delivered to 
media and government addresses in Florida, New York City, and 
Washington D.C.1 Government officials and the media soon began 
warning of a shortage of Cipro, the most effective antibiotic to treat 
anthrax poisoning.2 In response, President George W. Bush raised 
the prospect of breaking the patent on Cipro, which would have per-
mitted other pharmaceutical companies to produce the antibiotic.3 
The Government’s threatened action would have seriously harmed 
the value of the patent exclusivity, leading patentholders and patent 
commentators to ask: “Does such government conduct violate a pat-
entholder’s rights?”4 
 If government conduct were to affect patent value only through 
use in times of national emergency, this question would be less im-
portant. But such conduct occurs on a frequent basis. And such con-
duct is not limited to appropriation of the patented invention, but 
rather includes deprivation through changes to patent laws and 
regulations. These changes are often advanced as attempts to bal-
ance the benefits to patentholders with the societal cost of those 
benefits. For instance, the 2007 Patent Reform Act, which is cur-
rently under consideration, would eliminate remedies for infringe-
ment currently possessed by patentholders of certain “check collec-
tion” systems (presumably because of congressional concerns regard-
ing the societal costs of enforcing such patents).5 Likewise, proposed 
changes to patent laws have attempted to reduce the often high mo-
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Avram Goldstein & Michael Powell, Anthrax in Five More D.C. Build-
ings, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2001, at A1; NBC Tape Sent to Giuliani Contained Anthrax, 
CNN.COM, Nov. 4, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/conditions/11/04/anx.nbc.nyc/index.html; Rick 
Weiss, Source of Florida Anthrax Case Is Sought, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2001, at A5.  
 2. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Drugmakers Step Forward in Bioterror Fight, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 31, 2001, at A18 (“Bayer has been caught up in a controversy over whether the gov-
ernment should override its patent on Cipro and order the drug from other companies to 
ensure adequate supply.”); Anthony York, Is It Time to Bust the Cipro Patent?, SALON.COM, 
Oct. 18, 2001, http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/10/18/cipro_patent/ (discussing 
the concern of an inadequate supply of Cipro). 
 3. See, e.g., Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, The Treatment; Canada Overrides Patent 
for Cipro to Treat Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at A1 (noting that Senator Schumer 
of New York had called Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson to en-
courage the United States to follow Canada’s lead and break the Cipro patent). 
 4. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A Reevaluation 
of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 175 
(2002) (discussing the legal effects of unlicensed government use of Cipro); Lisa A. Haile, 
Bioterrorism: Can the U.S. Government Ignore Patent Rights of Pharmaceutical Compa-
nies?, DLA PIPER NEWS & INSIGHTS (May 6, 2002), 
http://www.dlapiper.com/global/publications/detail.aspx?pub=166; see also Ciprofloxacin: 
The Dispute Over Compulsory Licenses, http://cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro (providing links 
to articles and statements regarding the dispute) (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 5. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 14 (as reported by S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2008). The bill is currently on the Senate Legislative Calendar.  
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nopoly prices of patented pharmaceuticals, a subject that has devel-
oped into one of national concern.6 Such legislation may arguably 
have maximized the benefit to society as a whole; however, the trade-
off is the loss of patent value. In the case of the proposed 2007 Patent 
Reform Act, the estimated loss to the patentholders: $1 billion dol-
lars.7  
 This Article addresses whether the types of government actions 
described above8 could withstand due process claims. Until recently, 
aggrieved patentholders focused their efforts on seeking relief 
through the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, under which they 
may obtain “just compensation” for lost value.9 But, as I discussed in 
a previous article,10 in its 2006 decision in Zoltek Corp. v. United 
States, the Federal Circuit concluded that patents are not property 
for purposes of the Takings Clause,11 and eliminated patentholders’ 
ability to assert takings claims. In light of the Federal Circuit’s im-
portant dual role as the sole appellate court for any claims against 
the government and any claims asserted under the patent laws, its 
precedent will control this issue, and the Supreme Court’s denial of a 
writ of certiorari in that case leaves the ruling intact. Dismayed pat-
entholders12 are left with only one other likely constitutional basis for 
seeking relief from governmental conduct implicating their patented 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See, e.g., Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Senate Votes to Give Consumers Faster Ac-
cess to Generic Drugs, Amending Medicare Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A18 (noting 
amendment to limit the ability of drug companies with patented pharmaceuticals to delay 
federal approval of competing generic drugs). 
 7. The Congressional Budget Office reported that “the expected value of the federal 
government’s liability under section 14 [of S. 1145] would total about $1 billion, represent-
ing a royalty of 0.5 cents per check on more than 200 billion checks cleared by financial in-
stitutions that would be authorized to infringe on the rights of patent holders under the 
bill. Depending on the outcome of the likely litigation against the government, the cost 
could be substantially more.”  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR S. 1145, PATENT 
REFORM ACT OF 2007, at 6 (2008) [hereinafter CBO COST ESTIMATE FOR S. 1145], available 
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8981/s1145.pdf. 
 8. The federal government is responsible for most of the unlicensed government use 
of patented inventions. But cf. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (addressing federal legislation to compensate patentholders for 
unauthorized state use of patented inventions). Because patents are a creation of federal 
law, only the federal government can amend those laws. For those reasons, this Article fo-
cuses on patentholder claims against the federal government, rather than state actions. 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”). 
 10. Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist 
Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 11. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2936 (2007) (mem.).  
 12. See, e.g., Patent Hawk, Patent Prospector: Taking the Fifth (Sept. 23, 2006) 
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2006/09/taking_the_fifth.html (commenting that, thanks 
to the Federal circuit’s decision in Zoltek, “[i]t can be disgustingly impossible to hold the 
government accountable”). 
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inventions: the Due Process Clause.13 Due process claims threaten to 
invalidate legislation or enjoin executive action, and may also pro-
vide the basis for seeking compensation through “Bivens claims.”14 
Thus, whether these claims are viable is important, not only to pat-
entholders, but to the public who would be the presumed beneficiary 
of the changes.  
 This Article concludes, first, that patentholders should not be as 
confident as in past decades that courts will recognize due process 
protection for patents, and, second, that if courts continue to recog-
nize such protection, patentholders may have viable due process 
claims only in a limited number of circumstances. Part II examines 
the legal landscape resulting in increased conflict between patent 
rights and government conduct and explains the new importance of 
due process claims. Considering the recent elimination of the Tak-
ings Clause remedy, as well as the unreliability of statutory relief, it 
is likely that patentholders will increasingly turn to due process pro-
tection. 
 In light of this expected shift in approach, Part III analyzes 
whether patentholders can confidently rely on due process claims. In 
the Supreme Court’s only recent consideration of the issue in Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings 
Bank,15 as well as in modern lower court decisions, the right of paten-
tholders’ due process protection was based solely on labeling patents 
as “property.” But such perfunctory reasoning is flawed. Patent 
rights are not natural rights, but rather benefits granted by the fed-
eral government in order to promote innovation. As the Supreme 
Court has consistently reasoned for forty years, government benefits 
are not like traditional forms of “property,” and thus are not neces-
sarily entitled to the full panoply of constitutional protections. It is 
true that the Federal Circuit’s rejection in Zoltek of a Takings Clause 
remedy does not definitively resolve the question of whether Due 
Process Clause claims are viable, because there is support for inter-
preting the scope of protectible interests of each clause differently. 
But the unwillingness of both the per curiam opinion and the Federal 
Circuit’s subsequent en banc opinion denying rehearing to give any 
acknowledgement to Florida Prepaid’s approach to patents may rea-
sonably be seen to signal a significant shift away from presuming 
that patents are viewed as property. In light of the Supreme Court’s 
denial of certiorari in Zoltek, patentholders should not rely too heav-
                                                                                                                     
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 14. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). A Bivens claim is a common law basis for seeking monetary relief for a federal 
violation of constitutional rights. 
 15. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
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ily on Florida Prepaid when arguing for due process protection at the 
Federal Circuit. If we assume, however, that patents are not auto-
matically property, we are left with an obvious question: By what 
standard should courts decide whether or not patents are entitled to 
due process protection? As this Article explains, it would be both 
natural and appropriate to consider patents under the same stan-
dard that is applied in the government-benefits line of cases, which 
began with Goldberg v. Kelly16 and Board of Regents v. Roth17 and 
continues with their progeny, in order to determine if patents are en-
titled to due process protection.  
 Since there remains a possibility that the courts will apply the 
Goldberg/Roth standard to patents, Part IV engages in that analysis 
and concludes that patents have some but not all of the characteris-
tics of a protectible benefit. The fact that patents provide a public 
good—an incentive to innovate—supports the idea that patents are 
worthy of due process protection under Goldberg/Roth. Moreover, 
patents are established by a nondiscretionary statute with an ex-
press duration that creates a reasonable, objective expectation that 
the benefit will continue. Yet, unlike other federal benefits that the 
courts have previously awarded protection, patents do not have an 
easily discernible value (because the value of each patent is depend-
ent on the market for the patented technology), and they do not fall 
within the category of “essential” federal benefits. Thus, there is sub-
stantial doubt if patents could satisfy the Goldberg/Roth require-
ments for due process protection.  
 In any case, patentholders will only care about their right to due 
process protection if that protection will provide them with recourse 
against legislative and executive action. Thus, in Part V, I assume 
for the sake of argument that the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
will reaffirm patentholders’ due process protection. An examination 
of this ensuing question demonstrates both the potential value and 
potential threat of due process claims. Patentholders aggrieved by 
unlicensed government use might employ due process claims to ob-
tain injunctive relief, thereby hindering government function even 
for roles as crucial as national defense; patentholders affected by ret-
roactive legislation might be able to rely on such claims to obtain a 
significant and unanticipated damage award against the govern-
ment. 
  In sum, the expected burgeoning of patentholders’ due process 
claims should encourage both patentholders and the government to 
consider the likelihood of the success of those claims. The Federal 
Circuit is shifting away from knee-jerk Fifth Amendment property 
                                                                                                                     
 16. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 17. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
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protection of patents, and it is unclear that patentholders can count 
on such protection. Any hesitation to reaffirm such protection may 
result from recognition of the potential impact of successful claims, 
which may permit patentholders to either enjoin government conduct 
or obtain damage awards for their resulting losses. 
II.   WHY PATENTHOLDERS MAY SEEK TO RELY ON THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE TO PROTECT THEM FROM GOVERNMENT CONDUCT 
A.   Concerns of Patentholders Regarding Government Action 
 In the past quarter-century, intellectual property has become pro-
gressively more important to the United States economy. Innovators 
have developed a heightened awareness regarding the value of tech-
nology and are increasingly seeking to protect their inventions. This 
explains why the number of patent applications has tripled in the 
past twenty years.18 This explosion multiplies the already powerful 
effects of patents on our society. A patent gives its owner the exclu-
sive right to make, sell, use or import the patented technology; the 
resulting absence of natural competition permits a patentholder to 
make additional profit, generally referred to as “monopoly profit,” 
and provides the incentive to innovate. If another private actor in-
fringes on these patent exclusivities, the patentholder may seek 
damages that include its lost profits or a reasonable royalty from a li-
cense, and, if the infringement was intentional, possibly even addi-
tional damages. While the incentive created by this additional profit 
benefits society, there are countervailing costs to consumers and the 
economy as a whole: patentholders’ monopoly prices require that con-
sumers pay more for a product or forgo the purchase; a sole source 
may limit supply of the good and additional technological research in 
that field.  
 For most goods, the incentive effect appears to outweigh the costs 
to society. But in some cases Congress may conclude to the contrary; 
if so, it may enact legislation removing or restricting the patent ex-
clusivity. Particularly with regard to some especially valuable pat-
ents, the cost-benefit analysis has garnered public attention and has 
been the subject of proposed legislation eliminating some patents’ 
value. One section of the 2007 Patent Reform Act, currently under 
consideration, would abolish remedies for issued patents regarding 
various methods of check collection.19 This amendment would effec-
tively immunize the many financial institutions that use those inno-
                                                                                                                     
 18. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, NUMBER OF UTILITY PATENT APPLICATIONS 
FILED IN THE UNITED STATES, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, CALENDAR YEARS 1965 TO PRESENT 
(2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/oeip/taf/appl_yr.htm.  
 19. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 14 (as reported by S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2008). 
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vations when paying damages in infringement actions, with the ex-
pectation of lowered public expense—but at the cost of rendering 
these existing patents worthless. With the increasing value of intel-
lectual property and an associated growth in the number of patents 
comes an upsurge in the potential cost of these types of changes to 
the patent laws. 
 Patentholders are also threatened with lost value when the execu-
tive branch approves unlicensed use, directly or indirectly, of their 
inventions. The Cipro event described in the Introduction provides 
an example of official government sanction of unlicensed use of an 
invention.20 Granted, those circumstances were compelling, but such 
use would have effectively deprived the patentholder of the exclusiv-
ity which gives the patent its value. Bayer, owner of the Cipro pat-
ent, is only one of many affected patentholders; the government fre-
quently makes unauthorized use of patented inventions.21 The mush-
rooming interest of inventors in patenting has increased the likeli-
hood that the government may tread on patented territory and that 
such controversies will proliferate. Not surprisingly, patentholders 
facing losses in value, either from changes to patent laws or from 
government use of their inventions, are inclined to seek relief from 
such losses. The next Section addresses what avenues for relief pat-
entholders have relied upon historically and explains the sudden im-
portance of due process claims.  
B.   Aggrieved Patentholders’ Possible Remedies 
 Patentholder complaints about lost value from changes to patent 
laws are not new.22 Yet there is no statute authorizing the govern-
ment to award compensation from such losses, which is not surpris-
ing given that patent exclusivities exist only by federal grant in the 
first place. For many years, those patentholders nevertheless had re-
course via the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.23 If such a claim 
was successful, the patentholder was entitled to “just compensation.” 
                                                                                                                     
 20. Supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 21. For example, in 1996, the Defense Department authorized Lockheed Martin to 
produce the F-22 military aircraft. The government sanctioned the use of patented tech-
nology without requiring the contractor to obtain a license from the patentholder, Zoltek 
Corporation. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349 (2006) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2936 (2007) (mem.).  
 22. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985), modified, aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (establishing the 
regulatory takings doctrine by stating that “[t]he general rule at least is, that while prop-
erty may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as 
a taking”). 
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Unsurprisingly, as patents became increasingly valuable, the volume 
of such claims grew.24  
  There remains a statute, referred to as “section 1498,” that pro-
vides an avenue for “reasonable compensation” to a patentholder for 
unauthorized government use of his invention.25 Not all patenthold-
ers can rely on that statute for relief, however—as was the case in 
Zoltek.26 Thus the Zoltek plaintiff attempted to rely on a takings 
claim. In that 2006 decision the circuit court held that patents are 
not “property” for purposes of the Takings Clause.27 As a result, the 
court found that the federal government’s unauthorized use of a pat-
ented invention could not give rise to a takings claim.28 Given the 
Federal Circuit’s important dual role as the appellate court for 
claims against the government and the appellate court for claims as-
serted under the patent laws, its precedent controls this issue unless 
the Supreme Court overturns it. 
 In light of the Zoltek court’s elimination of regulatory takings 
claims, and the occasional inapplicability of section 1498, one can ex-
pect aggrieved patentholders to turn to the other property-related 
provision of the Fifth Amendment: the Due Process Clause. That 
clause proclaims that, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, lib-
erty or property, without due process of law.”29 Unlike section 1498 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Isaacs, supra note 10, at 23. 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1498. The government has been using patented technology without 
obtaining licenses since shortly after it began granting patents. See, e.g., Belknap v. Schild, 
161 U.S. 10 (1896); United States v. Palmer 128 U.S. 262 (1888); Hollister v. Benedict & 
Burnham Mfg. Co. 113 U.S. 59 (1885); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881); Cammeyer 
v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225 (1876); McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396 (1878). Yet for 
over one hundred years the government’s sovereign immunity prevented patentholders 
from obtaining any compensation. Indeed, even after Congress finally waived sovereign 
immunity in the Tucker Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (“An act to 
provide for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United States”) (primarily 
codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1509 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)), the courts still re-
fused to recognize patent infringement claims against the government (though the courts 
did occasionally recognize claims based on an implied or explicit breach of contract). 
Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1894). 
 26. In Zoltek, one step of the patented method occurred outside of the United States, 
defeating section 1498’s territorial requirement. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1370.  
 27. Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1362.  
 28. Id. at 1355.  
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment offers the same exhortation 
with regard to the states: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. As explained in the in-
troduction, because most of the relevant conduct will likely be by the federal government, 
this Article presumes that the clause at issue would be within the Fifth Amendment. That 
said, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between the type of conduct prohibited by 
the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the analysis of patentholder 
protection is considered with reference to cases applying either amendment.  
 It is worth a brief detour to ask whether it is even appropriate to evaluate patentholder 
protections under either the Fifth Amendment’s Takings or Due Process Clauses. After all, 
the Court has clearly stated that if there is a particular Constitutional provision restricting 
government action, it is that provision, rather than the Due Process Clause, that acts as 
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(or the now unavailable Takings Clause), which offers compensation 
for government action,30 the Due Process Clause directly provides in-
junctive relief.31 Such injunctive relief might stop any further harm 
to the patentholders, but at the cost of immediately obstructing gov-
ernment action. Due process protection also indirectly provides 
monetary relief—specifically, through a “Bivens claim,” which is a 
common law basis for seeking monetary relief for a federal violation 
of a constitutional right.32 
                                                                                                                     
the touchstone for determining the propriety of the government action. County of Sacra-
mento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1998) (“Because we have ‘always been reluctant to 
expand the concept of substantive due process,’ we held in Graham . . . that ‘[w]here a par-
ticular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against 
a particular sort of government behavior [such as the protections under the Fourth or 
Eighth Amendments], that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive 
due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’ ” (quoting Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). 
But while the Constitution’s Copyright and Patent Clause authorizes government action, it 
does not establish any such restrictions on government action. Because the clause does not 
contain any language protecting patentholders, a person looking for protection from over-
reaching government conduct would have to fall back on the default mechanism provided 
for by the Due Process Clause. 
 30. See Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (rejecting an 
argument that section 1498 permits the award of an injunction against an alleged in-
fringer to prevent bidding on a government contract, because section 1498 only authorizes 
the award of injunctions when the plaintiff is asserting a contract claim).  
 31. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Under some circumstances when the gov-
ernment has appropriated or sanctioned the appropriation of a patented invention, enjoin-
ing the government conduct may actually be preferable to section 1498 damages. Trojan, 
Inc., 885 F.2d 854 (rejecting plaintiff’s request for an injunction to prevent an alleged in-
fringer from bidding on a government contract). The patentholder may be concerned that 
the award will not adequately compensate it for the infringement. For instance, a paten-
tholder and a potential infringer may be competing bidders for a larger government con-
tract. In that case, an award of the royalty that the patentholder would be awarded in a 
private context may not fully compensate the patentholder for losing the contract. The pat-
entholder may not be legally entitled to the full lost profit that it could have made from the 
entire contract, or because of the purely business advantage that having a contract can 
provide—specifically, the opportunity for a company to develop or expand connections 
within the government and establish its credibility as a reliable supplier.  
 32. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). At this point, it is not clear if a violation of a patentholder’s due process rights 
would permit him or her to assert a Bivens claim. On the one hand, the Court has held 
that, “ ‘it is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal stat-
ute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any avail-
able remedy to make good the wrong done.’ ” Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 
684 (1946)). One would presume that, in comparison to a statutory right, a constitutional 
right would be even more firmly protected by all types of relief, including damages. But the 
Court has also declared that, “any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitu-
tional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitu-
tional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter what other means there 
may be to vindicate a protected interest.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2597 (2007). 
In Wilkie, which addressed retaliation against a property owner’s refusal to agree to an 
easement, the Court refused to recognize the Bivens remedy, id. at 2593, and noted its re-
fusal to apply a Bivens claim to, among others, First Amendment violations by federal em-
ployers, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), harm to military personnel through activity 
incident to service, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987), and a wrongful denial of 
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 Successful due process Bivens claims could have a dramatic im-
pact, because the awards to patent owners might very well be beyond 
what Congress would anticipate. While other due process plaintiffs 
have been awarded considerable sums,33 those numbers would likely 
pale in comparison to the lost value of a patent related to particularly 
valuable technology. For example, based on sales figures for 2000, 
Bayer’s patent monopoly on the anti-Anthrax drug, Cipro, was worth 
nearly $716 million per year.34 As a result, even limited government-
approved use of the patent could result in an enormous damage 
award. And Cipro is not an anomaly. As proposed, the elimination of 
remedies for infringement of certain check-collection patents would 
likely result in a loss to the patentholders (either from lost damages 
or unobtainable royalties from the licenses that they will not negoti-
ate with those financial institutions) of over $1 billion dollars.35 
Granted, as discussed later in this Article, it is not clear that most 
government conduct would be considered a due process violation. 
However, changes in the patent laws might have some impact on a 
minority of the tens of thousands of valid patents.  
 In sum, in light of Zoltek’s recent elimination of the Takings 
Clause as a remedy, as well as the limitations of section 1498 com-
pensation, one can expect aggrieved patentholders to seek relief 
through due process claims. Because the available remedies include 
enjoining government conduct and significant monetary relief, the 
viability of such claims should be of great interest to patentholders, 
and of great concern to the public and the government.  
III.   WHERE THE COURTS GO WRONG: MISAPPLICATION OF THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE TO PATENTS, IN LIGHT OF THE STATUS OF PATENTS 
AS FEDERAL BENEFITS 
 Recognizing the reason for patentholders’ interest in asserting due 
process claims, the next question is whether patentholders can in-
deed be confident that they are entitled to assert such claims. While 
courts, including the Supreme Court in Florida Prepaid Postsecond-
                                                                                                                     
Social Security disability benefits, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). Because this 
Article considers federal, rather than state, government conduct, the statute providing 
monetary relief for state violations does not apply here. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (authorizing 
redress for federal violations by state law, regulation, or custom). 
 33. See, e.g., Harris v. Roderick, 94-0359-CV-BLW (D. Idaho 2000) (awarding plaintiff 
$380,000 plus medical expenses in Bivens action against FBI agents and supervisors, U.S. 
Marshals, and the United States for shooting the plaintiff at Ruby Ridge Idaho in August 
of 1992). 
 34. See PUBLIC CITIZEN: CONGRESS WATCH, PATENTLY OFFENSIVE: CONGRESS SET TO 
EXTEND MONOPOLY PATENTS FOR CIPRO AND OTHER DRUGS 1 (2001), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF34F.PDF.  
 35. CBO COST ESTIMATE FOR S. 1145, supra note 7, at 6. 
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ary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,36 have been 
misled by their own reference to patents as “property,” the tide may 
be shifting. In Zoltek, the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that 
patents were property.37 In denying a rehearing en banc, the Federal 
Circuit rejected Justice Newman’s reliance on Florida Prepaid to 
suggest that patents are to be treated as property for all constitu-
tional purposes.  
 This reassessment is long overdue. A patent is not equivalent to 
real property; it is a federal benefit provided at the discretion of Con-
gress. If courts were to decide to focus on that genesis, they should 
consider how the Supreme Court has handled the Fifth Amendment 
rights of other federal benefits. Starting with two early-1970s cases, 
Goldberg v. Kelly38 and Board of Regents v. Roth,39 the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that all federal benefits 
qualify for due process protection and has provided factors to con-
sider in determining which benefits qualify. The courts may very well 
choose to apply the Goldberg/Roth analysis to determine if patents 
are entitled to due process protection.  
A.   Earlier Courts Offered No Meaningful Basis for Their Recognition 
of Patentholders’ Rights Under the Due Process Clause 
 Earlier Court decisions applied the Due Process Clause to patents, 
but failed to meaningfully justify their decision to do so.40 Despite 
                                                                                                                     
 36. 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (noting that patents “have long been considered a species 
of property” and thus “are surely included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be 
deprived by a State without due process of law”). 
 37. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349 (2006) (per curiam) (announc-
ing that “[a] patentee’s judicial recourse against the federal government, or its contractors, 
for patent infringement, is set forth and limited by the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1498”), cert. 
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2936 (2007) (mem.).  
 38. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 39. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 40. See, e.g., McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 608-09 
(1898). The McCormick Court held that due process principles prohibit a PTO examiner 
from rejecting claims in original patent pursuant to abandoned reissue process, stating 
that once a patent issues,  
it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not sub-
ject to be revoked or canceled by the President, or any other officer of the Gov-
ernment. It has become the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to 
the same legal protection as other property. 
Id. (citations omitted); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 262 (1897) (dis-
cussing the standard required to cancel a patent, stating “before the Government is enti-
tled to a decree cancelling a patent . . . it must . . . establish the fraud and the wrong by 
testimony which is clear, convincing and satisfactory”); McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1. 
How.) 202, 206 (1843) (rejecting the defendant’s attempt to apply a 1836 law to a previ-
ously issued patent, holding that the change in law could “have no effect to impair the 
right of property then existing in a patentee”); Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel in 
Foreign Parts v. Town of New-Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 493 (1823) (stating that “the 
termination of a treaty cannot devest rights of property already vested under it”). 
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Jefferson’s statements repudiating patents as property,41 mid-
nineteenth century opinions referred to patents as a form of “prop-
erty.”42 Thus, when the government’s use of patented inventions 
without payment troubled the courts, they analogized patents to real 
property.43  
                                                                                                                     
 41. Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising 
from [inventions], as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility.” 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (H. A. Washington ed., 1856).  
 42. But see Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical 
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 701 (2007) (“Con-
gresses and courts identified patents as property, and invoked natural-rights justifications 
for property in defining and adjudicating patent rights.”) [hereinafter Mossoff, Historical 
Protection]; Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Re-
evaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007) 
[hereinafter Mossoff, Thomas Jefferson]; see, e.g., McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206 (referring to the 
“right of property then existing in a patentee” in a patent infringement suit between pri-
vate parties, and, in order to provide due process, requiring application of the law in place 
at time of issuance of the patent, despite the law’s subsequent repeal). 
 43. See Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 16 (1896) (finding infringement against naval 
officers for manufacture and use of a patented caisson gate as part of their official duties, 
and rejecting the government’s assertion that sovereign immunity protected against dam-
ages, but holding that sovereign immunity prohibited injunctive relief, and stating that 
“this court has repeatedly and uniformly declared that the United States have no more 
right than any private person to use a patented invention without license of the patentee 
or making compensation to him.”); United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 269-72 (1888) 
(affirming a judgment against the United States in a case involving the Army’s manufac-
ture and use of patented military materials); Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 
113 U.S. 59, 67 (1885) (citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 356 (1881)); James, 104 
U.S. at 358 (stating that a “patented invention . . . cannot be appropriated or used by the 
government itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use 
without compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser”); Cammeyer 
v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234-35 (1876) (“Agents of the public have no more right to take 
such private property than other individuals under that provision, as it contains no excep-
tion warranting any such invasion of the private rights of individuals.”) 
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 This analogy has continued.44  Even in the face of the early 1970s 
Supreme Court rulings in Goldberg45 and Roth,46 in which the Court 
began distinguishing between those federal benefits that are entitled 
to due process protection and those that are not. Post-Goldberg deci-
sions should have applied that analysis to determine if patents are 
entitled to due process protection. Yet courts have repeatedly ignored 
the Goldberg/Roth line of cases. In its first post-Goldberg/Roth deci-
sion, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (precursor to the 
Federal Circuit) simply presumed, without any discussion, that the 
patent application at issue was property protected by due process.47 
Likewise, shortly after its 1983 creation, the Federal Circuit gave its 
first consideration to the issue in the 1985 case of Patlex Corp. v. 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 
(2002) (noting that a patent “is a property right”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser 
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933) (stating that “[a] patent is property”); Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. 
v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent 
for land.”); Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The patent 
right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of ‘property.’ ”); Myers v. United 
States, 613 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that “a patent is property, is depreciable 
and falls within the purview of § 1239” of the tax code, which “treat[s] as ordinary income” 
any gain resulting from “the sale or exchange of depreciable property”); Pierce v. Allen B. 
Du Mont Labs., Inc., 297 F.2d 323, 324-25 (3d Cir. 1961) (holding that patent infringement 
claims survived the death of the patentholder); see also Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and 
Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 690-91 (2005) (citing James, 104 U.S. 356); Shubha 
Ghosh, Reconciling Property Rights and States’ Rights in the Information Age: Federalism, 
the “Sovereign’s Prerogative” and Takings After College Savings, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 17, 41 
(1999) (observing that patents are property for purposes of the Taking Clause); Mossoff, 
Historical Protection, supra note 42, at 700-11 (arguing that, historically, patents have 
been recognized as property and noting several cases from the nineteenth century, includ-
ing James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881)); Justin Torres, The Government Giveth, and 
the Government Taketh Away: Patents, Takings, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 315 (2007) (arguing similarly).  
 45. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 46. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 47. In re Meyer, 599 F.2d 1026, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (finding that the appellant was 
denied procedural due process). If one presumes that a patentholder has a protectible 
property right, then perhaps it is not surprising that two courts have found that even pat-
ent applicants were found to be entitled to procedural due process. In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 
679, 687-88 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that the patent examiner’s failure to give the patent 
applicant proper notice of a modification to the examiner’s decision to narrow the scope of 
the patentable invention constituted a violation of procedural due process); Wm. T. Burnett 
& Co. v. Cumulus Fibres, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 734, 737 (W.D.N.C. 1993) (finding that the pat-
ent examiner’s decision to expand the scope of the interference without providing the pat-
ent applicant its right to present evidence, as provided for in the patent regulations, vio-
lated procedural due process). At least one court has rejected it outright, and another court 
has questioned that conclusion. See Brenner v. Ebbert, 398 F.2d 762, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
(observing that it had “considerable doubt whether appellees’ allowed but unissued patent 
is ‘property’ as that term is used in the fifth amendment,” but concluding regardless that 
the notice provided by the PTO for payment of the issue fee satisfied due process require-
ments); Harley v. Lehman, 981 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting a patent applicant’s 
challenge to the PTO’s withdrawal of a patent after its allowance by the Patent Office hold-
ing that pre-issuance a patent applicant has no protectible property interest). 
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Mossinghoff.48 In Patlex, Judge Pauline Newman rotely analogized 
patents to real property49 and concluded that such a description alone 
justified due process protection.50 Similarly, none of the subsequent 
decisions considering due process claims of patentholders—three by 
the Federal Circuit, one by another circuit, and one by a district 
court—contained any significant analysis. Some of those decisions re-
lied on Patlex as precedent,51 and some blankly assumed the applica-
bility of the Due Process Clause.52 At least one limited explanation 
for the lack of analysis is that these cases did not require the courts 
to grapple with the potential impact of due process remedies against 
the government. For one thing, in Patlex, the due process claim was 
brought as a defense, not as a claim against the government.53 In 
most other cases, where the claim was asserted against the govern-
ment, the courts concluded that there was no due process violation.54 
                                                                                                                     
 48. 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 
771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 49. Patlex Corp., 758 F.2d at 599 (citing Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 
966-68 (Ct. Cl. 1979)). “ ‘A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land,’ 
” and “therefore subject to the principles of eminent domain.” Id. (quoting Consol. Fruit-Jar 
v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (emphasis added)). The court in Patlex stated that “[i]t is 
beyond reasonable debate that patents are property.” Id. Indeed, Judge Newman goes so 
far as stating that, “[t]he basic right concomitant to the grant of a patent is the right of ex-
clusivity founded in the Constitution.” Id. However, there is no right to exclusivity founded 
in the Constitution.   
 50. Id. at 599. The circuit court then proceeded to uphold a retroactive statute that 
permitted reexamination of all patents, including patents issued prior to the statute’s en-
actment. Id. at 601.   
 51. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (relying 
solely on Patlex to affirm that patents did constitute due process property: “our precedent 
clearly establishes that patent property rights, ‘of which the patentee cannot be deprived 
without due process of law . . . .’ ” (quoting Patlex, 758 F.2d at 599)); see Consol. Fruit-Jar 
Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)); Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A. Erickson & 
Co., 627 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1980) (reaching its conclusion that “[t]he seventeen-year ex-
clusion is a right and not a matter of grace or favor. . . . It is a property right, . . . of which 
the patentee cannot be deprived without due process of law,” solely by relying on two nine-
teenth century cases supporting the proposition that patents are a form of property (citing 
James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881)). 
 52. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (accepting, without dis-
cussion, the patentholder’s assertion of entitlement to due process); Constant v. Advanced 
Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (analyzing plaintiff’s assertion 
that permitting federal courts to invalidate issued patents constitutes a deprivation of a 
patentholder’s right to procedural due process, but assuming that such a right exists); Ry-
deen v. Quigg, 748 F. Supp. 900, 906 (D.D.C. 1990) (examining patentholder’s claim that 
the PTO’s last-minute reminder to pay maintenance fees violated his due process rights, 
but assuming that such a right exists), aff’d, 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
 53. Patlex considered whether a recently enacted statute expanding the circum-
stances under which a defendant could seek reexamination of a patent could apply to a 
pending patent infringement suit. Patlex, 758 F.2d at 596. The district court hearing the 
infringement suit permitted the defendant to seek a reexamination by the PTO. Id. The 
patentholder argued that the retroactive impact of the statute had violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., In re Hiniker, 150 F.3d at 1367-68 (rejecting plaintiff’s due process claim 
because of its failure to satisfy the PTO’s procedures for requesting a hearing); Cedars-
642  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:627 
 
By finding that there was no due process violation, the courts were 
able to assume that patents were indeed entitled to such protection 
without giving much consideration to the merit of those assertions. 
 Since Goldberg and Roth, only two Supreme Court cases have ad-
dressed the due process rights of patentholders. Sadly, the Court’s 
analysis was as perfunctory as that of the lower courts’. In the 1993 
case of Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., the 
Court considered a patentholder’s allegation that due process was 
violated by the Federal Circuit’s general practice of vacating declara-
tory judgments of patent validity following a determination of non-
infringement.55 While finding for the patentholder, the Court gave no 
explanation for the conclusion that patents were entitled to due proc-
ess.56 Perhaps the Court felt that detailed discussion of the paten-
tholder’s rights was not strictly necessary, because the Court offered 
an independent reason for enjoining the Federal Circuit practice—
that it violated the Supreme Court’s own established rule of issue 
preclusion.57 In any case, the rare concern regarding judicial appel-
late practice bears little resemblance to the more common due proc-
ess claims that can be expected in the future, which are likely to be 
concerned with unauthorized use of an invention or legislative re-
striction on patent exclusivity.  
 The due process question arose once again in Florida Prepaid,58 
though as in Patlex, only indirectly. In that case, College Savings 
Bank sued to recover compensation under the Patent and Plant Va-
riety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (hereinafter “the Patent 
Remedy Act”), that established a patent infringement claim against 
states. Florida asserted Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; 
in response, College Savings Bank argued that the Patent Remedy 
                                                                                                                     
Sinai Med. Ctr., 11 F.3d at 1585 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim as not ripe for adjudication); 
Rydeen, 748 F. Supp. at 906 (rejecting a patentholder’s due process claim, because the PTO 
had no duty to individually inform patentholders when their maintenance fees were due, 
so the PTO’s last-minute reminder did not violate the patentholder’s due process rights); 
Constant, 848 F.2d at 1565 (rejecting the argument that permitting federal courts to in-
validate issued patents constitutes a deprivation of a patentholder’s right to procedural 
due process). 
 55. 508 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1993). 
 56. Id. at 102 (concluding that the circuit court’s practice “may unfairly deprive the 
patentee itself of the appellate review that is a component of the one full and fair opportu-
nity to have the validity issue adjudicated correctly”). 
 57. Id. (“The Federal Circuit’s practice . . . encourages endless litigation (or at least 
uncertainty) over the validity of outstanding patents, and thereby vitiates the [issue pre-
clusion] rule announced in Blonder-Tongue.”); see John Donofrio, The Disposition of Unre-
viewable Judgments by the Federal Circuit, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 462, 464 
(1991) (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s present practice of vacating such judgments [even if it cor-
rectly considers them unreviewable] should not continue because it permits litigants to de-
stroy the conclusiveness of invalidity holdings.”). 
 58. 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999).  
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Act abrogated that immunity.59 But the Act could only properly abro-
gate state immunity if it was intended to remediate or prevent a con-
stitutional violation. College Savings Bank argued that, by using the 
patented technology without compensating the owner, the state had 
deprived the patentholder of its property without due process of 
law.60 The Supreme Court once again reflexively held that patents 
were property for purposes of the Due Process Clause,61 relying solely 
on 19th century cases for its conclusion that “[p]atents . . . have long 
been considered a species of property.”62 As with many earlier lower 
court cases, its acceptance of due process protection had no effect on 
the outcome. The Court found that there was little evidence in the 
legislative record to support the proposition that Congress was at-
tempting to remedy any potential state due process violations,63 and 
there was little evidence that such state due process violations 
were prevalent.64  
 In sum, the recent Supreme Court decisions reiterated the per-
functory and misguided due process protection given by previous 
courts, without giving any thought to the effect of patentholders’ due 
process claims against the federal government. But as courts begin to 
see patentholders’ claims seeking injunctive relief and compensation 
from government conduct, it should come as no surprise that they 
will give the matter deeper consideration. As indicated below, paten-
tholders who might have felt safe relying on Florida Prepaid’s analy-
sis, flawed as it might be, should be less certain as to its value 
since Zoltek.  
                                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 633.  
 60. Id. at 641-42. 
 61. Id. at 642 (“[P]atents may be considered ‘property’ for the purposes of our analy-
sis . . . .”). 
 62. Id. “ ‘For, by the laws of the United States, the rights of a party under a patent 
are his private property.’ ” Id. (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 197 
(1856)). “ ‘A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land.’ ” Id. (quoting 
Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)). The court concluded that patents 
“are surely included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State 
without due process of law.” Id. 
 63. Id. (“Though patents may be considered ‘property’ for purposes of our analysis, the 
legislative record still provides little support for the proposition that Congress sought to 
remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the Patent Remedy Act.”). 
 64. Id. at 646-47. The Court rejected College Savings Bank’s contention that the legis-
lation was equally justified under the Takings Clause.  
There is no suggestion in the language of the statute itself, or in the House or 
Senate Reports of the bill which became the statute, that Congress had in mind 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since Congress was so 
explicit about invoking its authority under Article I and its authority to prevent 
a State from depriving a person of property without due process of law under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, we think this omission precludes consideration of 
the Just Compensation Clause as a basis for the Patent Remedy Act.  
Id. at 642 n.7. 
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B.   Zoltek Suggests a New Recognition that the Goldberg/Roth 
Analysis Should Be Applied to Determine Patentholders’ Due Process 
Rights 
 Earlier courts repeatedly offered nothing more than a knee-jerk 
response to patentholders’ due process claims. Zoltek brought the 
Federal Circuit face-to-face with a patentholder’s attempt to obtain 
compensation from the government. Under those circumstances, the 
Federal Circuit was finally motivated to reconsider its previously ac-
cepted rationale of patentholder rights, and it found that rationale 
wanting. Indeed, Judge Dyk, in his concurring opinion in Zoltek, di-
rectly rebuked the dissent’s argument that, “[a] patent for an inven-
tion is as much property as a patent for land”65—based on the same 
cases upon which courts had repeatedly relied—declaring, instead, 
that “[p]atent rights are creatures of federal statute. They do not ex-
ist in the abstract.”66 In light of the earlier cases, a gambler might 
have reasonably wagered that the Federal Circuit would grant a re-
hearing en banc and overrule the panel in Zoltek. Indeed, one poster 
to the well-established Patently-O Website, in general accord with 
others on the site, even went so far as to forecast that “[an] [e]n banc 
petition [is] virtually assured, and reversal [of the panel’s decision is] 
likely.”67 Yet, despite the Zoltek panel’s indifference to a long line of 
precedent, the Federal Circuit denied the request for a rehearing en 
banc and the Supreme Court chose to deny certiorari.68 
 Only the Justices know precisely why they voted against hearing 
Zoltek’s appeal; however, one can say at a minimum that no four 
Justices were so unsatisfied with the Zoltek panel’s (arguable) con-
tradiction of earlier cases to make overturning it a priority. The Fed-
eral Circuit en banc majority might have concluded as Justice Breyer 
has argued: that the term “property” could have a different signifi-
cance in the Due Process Clause than in the Takings Clause. Justice 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1374 (Plager, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Consol. Fruit-Jar Co., 94 U.S. at 96) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2936 
(2007) (mem.). 
 66. Id. at 1370 (Dyk, J., concurring).  
I note that Judge Plager’s interesting discourse on takings jurisprudence com-
pletely fails to explain how taking of a property right could possibly have oc-
curred here. Patent rights are creatures of federal statute. They do not exist in 
the abstract. If, as I urge, the patent holder’s right to sue the government for 
infringement under 1498(a) is no broader than the rights of the patent holder 
against private parties under section 271(a), then there can be no taking result-
ing from the refusal to recognize a greater right against the government. 
Id. 
 67. Posting of Michael L. Slonecker to Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/04/cafc_patent_rig.html (Apr. 6, 2006, 12:05 EST).   
 68. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (denying a request 
for rehearing en banc), cert. denied, Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2936 
(2007) (mem.)  
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Breyer has noted that “the word ‘property’ . . . . appears in the midst 
of different phrases with somewhat different objectives, thereby 
permitting differences in the way in which the term is interpreted,” 
and has noted that similar distinctions have been made in other con-
stitutional interpretations, even between phrases within the same 
Amendment.69 If this were so, then there might be forms of property 
that are entitled to due process protection even though they are not 
entitled to Takings Clause protection. If one were to assume that the 
textual difference is meant to suggest that “private property” is a 
subset of all property, then nonprivate property would seem to in-
clude property interests that exist only if the public—that is, the fed-
eral government—creates them. Thus the Court could have recon-
ciled Zoltek with Florida Prepaid to find that federal benefits may 
qualify as property for purposes of the Due Process Clause even if 
they do not qualify for purposes of the Takings Clause.70 But, notably 
and significantly, neither the Zoltek panel’s decision nor the Federal 
Circuit en banc denial of rehearing rested on that linguistic distinc-
tion. 
 A change in mindset would seem to be justified because, as estab-
lished as patents-as-property analogy was, it is not clearly required 
by the early understanding of patents. Patents are not like the tradi-
tional forms of property to which the Framers assumed a natural 
right, and nomenclature alone does not clarify which rights should 
attach to them.71 It is true that patents share some characteristics 
                                                                                                                     
 69. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 557 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the Court has held that the term “person” includes corporations for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, but not for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Self-
Incrimination Clause); see also John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue 
and the Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 709-
10 (1993) (observing the Court’s failure to address, in any meaningful way, the distinction 
between the clauses). In this interpretation, the later Takings Clause reference to “private 
property” would appear to be a retraction from the first, broader reference to “property” of 
the Due Process Clause. Id.; Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits 
and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 
107, 128 n.120 (2005) (“As is the case today, at the time of the framing, the term ‘property’ 
had various meanings in various contexts.”). While it is fair to note that “one must be cau-
tious about drawing inferences from differences in language” within the Constitution, 
there has been significant criticism of using the Constitution’s precise text to decide the 
Framers’ intended interpretation. Id. at 128. Nonetheless, “the proximity of the Due Proc-
ess and Takings Clauses suggests that the difference was intended to have some meaning.” 
Id.; see also Echevarria & Dennis, supra, at 709 (“The differences in language between the 
Due Process and Takings Clauses strongly suggest that each clause has a different scope 
and meaning.”). 
 70. As indicated in my previous article, some federal benefits have received Due Proc-
ess Clause protection but have been denied Takings Clause protection. Isaacs, supra note 
10, at 40-41.  
 71. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (“The constitutional challenge cannot 
be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are ‘a privilege and not a 
right.’ ” (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969))). 
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with ownership of real and personal property; indeed, the document 
establishing ownership rights in land was traditionally described as 
a “land patent.”72 Although a patent does not provide an “affirmative” 
property right—that is, it does not authorize the owner to do any-
thing—it does provide the “negative” property right of exclusive 
use.73 Moreover, it provides the right to transfer one’s patent interest, 
a right associated with property.74 Nonetheless, it is “an uncontrover-
sial historical observation” that those inventions were not protected 
at common law, and that “[patents’] origin was found in the English 
Crown’s royal prerogative to grant manufacturing monopolies.”75 
Throughout most of American legal history, “lawyers, jurists, and 
scholars agreed that a patent was neither a natural right nor a com-
mon law right.”76 As Thomas Jefferson noted back in 1813, patents 
are “a special ‘gift of social law,’ ”77 only to be provided to the extent 
that they “benefit [ ] society.”78 Given Jefferson’s view, it is not sur-
prising that his contemporaries did not establish a requirement 
within the Constitution’s Copyright and Patent Clause that Congress 
create copyrights and patents; it simply authorizes Congress to pro-
vide such exclusivities to the extent they are socially valuable.79 The 
Supreme Court’s 1834 opinion in Wheaton v. Peters affirmed that 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 867 (1999) (“Land 
patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 conveyed to the patentee 
the land and everything in it, except the ‘coal,’ which was reserved to the United States.”); 
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1998) (noting that in order to support their 
Takings Clause claim, petitioners attempted to find evidence of a land patent to assert 
their claim of title); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 382-83 (1996) 
(noting analogy between the court’s role in patent claim construction with “interpreting 
terms within a land patent”). 
 73. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (characterizing the right 
to exclude others as “essential” and “central” to the value of private property).  
 74. Blanchard’s Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner, 3 F. Cas. 653, 657 (C.C.D. 
Conn. 1846) (No. 1,521) (recognizing the value to a patentholder of the right to assign his 
“rights and privileges”). 
 75. Mossoff, Historical Protection, supra note 42, at 705, 705 n.84. But see, e.g., Gayler 
v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493 (1850) (recognizing that an inventor is “vested by law 
with an inchoate right . . . which he may perfect and make absolute” in obtaining a patent); 
Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873-74 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564) (noting that an inven-
tor has an “inchoate property which [is] vested by the discovery” and which is ultimately 
“perfected by the patent”). 
 76. Mossoff, Thomas Jefferson, supra note 42, at 990; see, e.g., Jacobs v. Hamilton 
County, 13 F. Cas. 276, 278 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 7,161) (“The patent itself, with all 
the privileges which it confers, is the creature of the statute . . . .”).  
 77. Mossoff, Thomas Jefferson, supra note 42, at 957 (quoting Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
333 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903)). 
 78. Id. at 954 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra 
note 77.  
 79. The Copyright and Patent Clause provides that Congress shall have power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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view: “There is at common law no property in [patent exclusivities]; 
there is not even a legal right entitled to protection.”80 Nonetheless, 
patent exclusivities stimulate innovation, which justified permitting 
Congress to grant these limited monopolies: “Society may give an ex-
clusive right to the profits arising from [inventions], as an encour-
agement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility.”81 Be-
cause patents are merely statutory rights, the Wheaton Court de-
clared that Congress is empowered to provide as much or as little 
patent protection as it wishes.82  
 In light of the status of patents as federally granted benefits, one 
would have expected courts to have applied the test used for other 
federally granted benefits to patents as well. Starting with the early 
1970’s cases of Goldberg83 and Roth,84 the Supreme Court distin-
guished between those federal benefits that are entitled to due proc-
ess protection and those that are not, and began providing a frame-
work for determining when a federal benefit is entitled to due proc-
ess. The Court has consistently applied this analysis to all types of 
government benefits. It has accorded the protection of due process to 
some government benefits, such as the rights to attend public 
school85 and hold a driver’s license,86 while rejecting due process pro-
tection for other government benefits such as domestic violence re-
                                                                                                                     
 80. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 600 (1834); see Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infir-
mary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865) (“At common law an inventor 
has no exclusive right to his invention or discovery.”); Motte v. Bennett, 17 F. Cas. 909, 913 
(C.C.D.S.C. 1849) (No. 9,884) (discussing the history of patents as “privileges and monopo-
lies” granted by “the kings of England”).  
 81. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson supra note 77. The argument 
that the constitutional authorization in the Copyright and Patent Clause provides the ba-
sis for a right has been rejected. See, e.g., Figueroa v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 488, 495 
(2003) (“[T]he Patent Clause ‘does not in any way confer a substantive right on any indi-
vidual,’ and does not mandate the payment of money.” (citation omitted)).  
 82. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 600 (“Congress, therefore, when authorised to secure 
their rights, are authorised to do every thing; and full power over the subject is delegated 
to them. . . . In creating patents they take nothing away. They deprive the inventor of no 
property. He had nothing, and they gave him all merely by securing.”); see also Patterson 
v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1878). The Patterson Court stated: 
“[T]he national power will be fully satisfied if the property created by patent be, 
for the given time, enjoyed and used exclusively, so far as, under the laws of the 
several States, the property shall be deemed for toleration. There is no need of 
giving this power any broader construction in order to attain the end for which 
it was granted, which was to reward the beneficent efforts of genius, and to en-
courage the useful arts.” 
Patterson, 97 U.S. at 508-09 (quoting Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1812)).  
 83. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 84. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 85. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (Ohio law conferred a right upon all chil-
dren to attend school). 
 86. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 535-39 (1971) (invalidating a statute suspending 
drivers’ licenses where the driver was involved in an automobile accident, unless the driver 
furnished security to satisfy a judgment or gave proof of financial responsibility).  
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straining orders87 and Medicaid payments.88 Notably, in none of those 
cases did the Court ever indicate that there are government benefits 
to which the Goldberg/Roth analysis should not apply. When the 
Supreme Court is finally faced directly with a patentholder’s due 
process claim seeking a large monetary award, it may conclude that 
it is more appropriate to apply the Goldberg/Roth standard for de-
termining whether federal benefits are entitled to due process protec-
tion.  
IV.   UNDER THE GOLDBERG/ROTH ANALYSIS, IT IS UNCLEAR IF 
FEDERAL BENEFITS ARE ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
PROTECTION 
 Application of the Goldberg/Roth analysis reveals that patents 
possess some, but not all, of the characteristics of a protectible fed-
eral benefit. Thus, a patentholder would be justified in having 
qualms about whether the Court will award due process protection to 
his claims.  
 Not all federal benefits fall within the auspices of “life, liberty and 
property,” and the corresponding Due Process Clause protection.89 
The question of where to draw the line between a property interest 
that is protectible, and one that is not, comes into play when the is-
sue of personal (i.e., individualized) government benefits arises be-
cause creating rights to these benefits restricts the government’s 
ability to make policy changes.  
 Starting with Goldberg and Roth in the early 1970s, the Supreme 
Court began developing a framework for determining when a federal 
benefit is entitled to due process.90 In Goldberg, the Court concluded 
that government benefits provided pursuant to Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) were a “property interest” entitled to 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005). 
 88. O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 784 (1980) (rejecting the ar-
gument that the nursing home residents possessed a property right to Medicaid payments 
to their preferred nursing home). As to protections for continued government employment, 
the Court found a property interest in one case while declining to find a property interest 
in another. Compare Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (plaintiff was a 
teacher employed by Wisconsin State University under a limited-time contract that in-
cluded no provided for renewal; the court found no reasonable expectation of renewal) with 
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) (finding that even though the teacher did not 
have formal tenure, he possessed a legitimate expectation of continued employment based 
on “a no less binding understanding” fostered by the college administration and the faculty 
guidebook). 
 89. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (noting that “[t]he pro-
cedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect everything that might be 
described as a ‘benefit’ ”).  
 90. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Roth, 408 U.S. at 564.  
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procedural due process protection.91 Just a few years later in Roth, 
the Court rejected the assertion of a property interest in renewed 
employment at a state university.92 Through Goldberg, Roth, and the 
cases that followed, the Court developed the requirements for “prop-
erty interests” worthy of due process protection. A patentholder’s en-
titlement to due process protection depends on whether he meets 
those characteristics. Patents clearly satisfy some of these require-
ments, but it is unclear whether they satisfy others. 
 There would be little value in designating as a protected interest 
any government benefit that does not serve the public interest. Thus 
the Court has held that, to be considered due process “property,” the 
benefit must have been provided with the intention of promoting the 
public welfare.93 And the modern federal government has instituted 
many such entitlements: “Society today is built around entitlement . . 
. . Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow from 
government; subsidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for air-
lines and channels for television stations; long term contracts for de-
fense, space, and education; social security pensions for individu-
als.”94 Indeed, one would hope that such benefits are given only when 
they promote the public welfare, rather than the result of undue po-
litical influence. As indicated by the Copyright and Patent Clause it-
self, patent rights meet this requirement by providing both an incen-
tive to pursue new technology and providing the community with ac-
cess to the innovative knowledge.95  
 However, even though they provide some use to society, most gov-
ernment benefits have been found not to constitute protected prop-
erty.96 The Court requires that federal benefits possess several other 
characteristics as well. Protected property must be founded upon a 
statute or regulation,97 as opposed to common law,98 and the benefit 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261-62. Goldberg required that the welfare beneficiary be 
granted a hearing before removing his benefits. Id. at 264. 
 92. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. 
 93. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265.  
 94. Id. at 262 n.8 (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: 
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)). 
 95. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that plaintiff’s gov-
ernment employment was not a protectible right, even though the position was beneficial 
to the public).  
 97. See, e.g., id. at 262. 
 98. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1977) (rejecting the argument 
that violation of “the common-law right of a child not to be subjected to excessive corporal 
punishment in school” could be the basis for a deprivation of due process); Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (noting that an interest in reputation, “protect[ed] against in-
jury by virtue of its tort law” was not a property interest protected by procedural due proc-
ess); see also Arlo Chase, Maintaining Procedural Protections for Welfare Recipients: Defin-
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must be nondiscretionary—that is, the statute must necessarily con-
fer the benefit if the person qualifies.99 But even statutory language 
purporting to establish a government obligation is not always suffi-
cient to confer a protected status100: “Although the underlying sub-
stantive interest is created by ‘an independent source . . .,’ federal 
constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level 
of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Proc-
ess Clause.’ ”101  
 Nonetheless, starting the analysis with the statutory language 
suggests that patents likely meet this requirement. The Patent Act 
generally requires issuance of a patent if the invention is novel, non-
obvious, and useful, and that the inventor sufficiently discloses the 
invention in his application: “If it appears that applicant is entitled 
to a patent under the law, a written notice of allowance of the appli-
cation shall be given or mailed to the applicant,” and assuming the 
applicant then pays the required fee, “the patent shall issue.”102 But 
one cannot rest the analysis on that wording alone, because there are 
in fact circumstances in which the government may refuse issuance 
from, and may even suppress publication of, an otherwise proper 
patent application. For instance, specifically exempted from patent-
ing is any invention “which is useful solely in the utilization of spe-
                                                                                                                     
ing Property for the Due Process Clause, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 571, 580 (1997) 
(“[The] expectation can only come from the specific mandates of the applicable law or regu-
lation.”); Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing “Revolution” and “Reform”: Procedural Due Proc-
ess and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 616 (1998) (“In Paul v. Davis, it 
balked at the notion that promises made by government through its judiciary, speaking in 
the common-law mode, would count as entitlements.”). No court has provided a definitive 
reason why a protected property could not arise from common law, but the ambiguity of 
common law would make it difficult to define precisely what the property interest is—and 
clear “metes and bounds” is one of the basic characteristics of property. See also Roth, 408 
U.S. at 577 (holding that property interests protected by due process are “defined by exist-
ing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law”).  
 99. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (“Our cases recognize 
that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in 
their discretion.”); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (Ohio law conferred a 
right upon all children to attend school).  
 100. For instance, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Court rejected the assertion 
of a property interest in enforcement of a domestic violence restraining order, even though 
the statute’s language stated that police “shall use” every reasonable means to enforce the 
order. Id. at 752, 768. The Court found that the statute’s use of the mandatory “shall” did 
not obviate discretion. Discretion was indicated by several factors, including the statute’s 
list of alternatives to immediate enforcement of the restraining order, the absence of the 
express right to request or demand an arrest, and the accepted understanding that arrests 
are generally held to be discretionary based on the officers’ belief that there is probable 
cause to make it. Id. at 760-66. 
 101. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 757 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. 
v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 756 (noting 
that “[t]he procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect everything 
that might be described as a ‘benefit’ ”). 
 102. 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (emphasis added).  
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cial nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon,”103 or 
when publication or issuance of the patent would “be detrimental to 
the national security.”104 Thus, while the patent statute appears to be 
in most cases nondiscretionary, one cannot say that an otherwise 
qualified applicant possesses an absolute right to this benefit. None-
theless, on balance, the language of the patent statute approaches 
the obligatory nature of most protected federal benefits. 
 Regardless, an initial right to the benefit is not enough to create a 
property interest. There must be an objectively reasonable expecta-
tion that the benefit will continue.”105 An objectively reasonable ex-
pectation will be derived from government assurance, based on either 
regulations and laws or less formal agreements.106 Patentholders 
have a strong argument for having such a reasonable reliance be-
cause the Patent Act contains an express statement declaring that a 
patentholder will maintain his patent rights for a specific period of 
time—in the case of utility patents, twenty years from the date that 
the inventor filed his application.107 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1946). The AEA provides compensation to 
the inventor in order to, as the act’s legislative history explains, “assure the [Atomic En-
ergy] Commission of access to new inventions and . . . provide . . . financial inducements in 
lieu of patent rights . . . .” S. REP. NO. 79-1211 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 
1327, 1335. 
 104. Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1952). Like the AEA, the Invention Se-
crecy Act provides for compensation. Id. § 183; see Constant v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 629 
(1989), aff’d, 884 F.2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (addressing a dispute regarding a claim for 
compensation provided for by the Act after plaintiff’s patent application was placed under 
a secrecy order pursuant to the Invention Secrecy Act); see also Hornback v. United States, 
16 F.3d 422 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (same analysis). 
 105. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“[t]o have a property interest in a 
benefit, a person clearly must . . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it).  
 106. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 n.9 (1985) (“We recog-
nize, of course, that ‘mutually explicit understandings’ may operate to create property in-
terests.” (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 601)). But such understandings or tacit agreements 
must support a “legitimate claim of entitlement” under “ ‘an independent source such as 
state law . . . .’ ” Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 n.7 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).  
 107. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant 
shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years 
from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States . . . .”). 
In the case of design patents, the time period is fourteen years. 35 U.S.C. § 173. The gov-
ernment might be able to thwart the creation of a property interest by making it clear 
upon issuance of the patent that the terms and conditions of the patent may change at any 
time during its effective period (such as to create an exception for the government to the 
patentholder’s exclusivity), or that it retains the right to administratively terminate or 
change patent rights at an earlier time under conditions that would not satisfy due proc-
ess. One would expect that any restrictions on the benefits would affect the reasonableness 
of any new recipient’s expectation in light of the statute. Whether such a change in expec-
tation could constitutionally affect the holders of already issued patents depends on how 
the court treated such retroactive provisions.  
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 The third requirement of the Goldberg test is that the benefit 
must be connected to wealth.108 There need not be a direct govern-
ment payment; even a government benefit that indirectly provides 
the possibility of obtaining wealth, such as a driver’s license, may es-
tablish a property interest.109 But the benefit must generally have an 
“ ‘ascertainable monetary value . . . .’ ”110 Without that characteristic, 
the asserted right would not “resemble any traditional conception of 
property.”111 The Court appears to be of two minds as to whether a 
definable monetary value is an absolute requirement. On the one 
hand, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Court stated that the 
absence of an ascertainable monetary value by itself did not disqual-
ify the asserted benefit—a protective order from an abusive spouse—
from due process protection.112 But as the Court rejected protection 
for that benefit, it noted that “even our ‘Roth-type property-as-
entitlement cases’ ” had “implicitly required” that feature.113 Never-
theless, apparently the requirement can be tenuous because, in Goss 
v. Lopez, the Supreme Court found that there was a protectible prop-
erty interest in a public school education.114 There can be little ques-
tion that there is a value to education, but education’s economic 
value in any particular circumstance is speculative, and thus not “as-
certainable” by any court. Nonetheless, it would appear fair to say 
that it would be rare for a benefit lacking that feature to qualify.  
 It is unclear whether patent protection would satisfy this quasi-
requirement. Patent protection provides the potential for economic 
value through monopoly profits or licensing royalties. The govern-
ment’s grant of a patent does not directly provide wealth, however. If 
the patented technology does not have significant market value, then 
the patentholder will not obtain much revenue from the product at 
monopoly prices, nor will the patentholder be able to obtain substan-
tial licensing royalties. Nonetheless, patents might satisfy the very 
low minimum threshold for the connection to wealth, much like a 
public school education. While the monetary value of a patent is not 
as immediate as it is for a direct subsidy, it is certainly no more 
tenuous than the connection between public education and wealth.  
                                                                                                                     
 108. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (quoting Reich, supra note 94, 
at 1255). 
 109. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 535-39 (1971) (invalidating a statute suspending 
drivers’ licenses where the driver was involved in an automobile accident, unless they fur-
nished security to satisfy a judgment or gave proof of financial responsibility).  
 110. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 
964 (2000)).  
 111. Id.; see Merrill, supra note 110. 
 112. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766. 
 113. Id. at 766 (quoting Merrill, supra note 110, at 964). 
 114. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
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 In any case, the monetary gain cannot be merely a helpful “lux-
ury” to the recipient.115 Rather, the Court has suggested that the 
benefit must be, to some extent, essential to the recipient,116 though it 
has not attempted to define that nebulous concept. Safely included 
within that category are entitlements that provide basic living re-
quirements such as food and shelter,117 and that requirement appears 
to extend to any benefit, such as continued possession of a driver’s li-
cense, which is likely to be sufficiently important “in the pursuit of a 
livelihood.”118 Also included in that category is public education, 
“ ‘perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments . . . .’ ”119 Patents do not fit as clearly within the realm of “es-
sential” benefits, because they are not necessarily needed in order to 
make a living. While some goods may be so inexpensive to replicate 
that the marginal profit in a competitive market would be small, 
some scholars have argued that the first-comer advantage makes 
patents unnecessary for sufficient compensation.120 Either way, re-
                                                                                                                     
 115. See Pearson v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. IP99-1857-C-T/G, 2000 WL 
1030616, at *17 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (rejecting due process claim, stating “what was at stake 
here, unlike a right to welfare benefits in [Goldberg], or a public education in [Goss], was a 
tennis match. Granted, it was the state semi-finals, but nevertheless it was just a ten-
nis match”). 
 116. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). “For qualified recipients, welfare 
provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.” Id. at 
264; see also Potts v. City of Philadelphia, 224 F. Supp. 2d 919, 943 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“While 
[the plaintiff] may have a strong personal interest in his gun permit, the permit does not 
constitute a basic necessity of life, such as income, or even employment, that would 
strongly militate in favor of a pre-deprivation hearing.”).  
 117. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261 (“ ‘Against the justified desire to protect public funds 
must be weighed the individual’s overpowering need in this unique situation not to be 
wrongfully deprived of assistance . . . .’ ” (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 
901 (1968))). 
 118. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that the government had to pro-
vide a hearing before suspending a person’s driver’s license). In Bell the Court held that 
due process required a prior hearing to determine the probability of a judgment against 
that driver. Id. at 542. While the Court did not outline all of the rights that would be in-
volved in order to meet due process, the opinion indicated that the procedures would be 
somewhat less than the administrative trial that Goldberg had mandated. Id. at 540-43. 
But not all interests in control over daily living fall underneath that protected umbrella. 
See O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 784 (1980) (upholding a pre-
hearing termination of Medicaid payments to nursing home that failed to meet minimum 
government standards; although the ability to remain in the nursing home of their choice 
was obviously important to the residents, the Court rejected the argument that the nurs-
ing home residents possessed a property right). 
 119. Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 120. James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies 3 
(Boston Univ. Sch. Of Law, Research on Innovation 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=327760 (“When firms do not assert their patents, innovators may 
still realize rents because of lead time advantages. Empirical research finds that firms see 
lead time advantages and related advantages as strong sources of appropriability─stronger 
than patents, in fact, except in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries.” (citing Wesley 
M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why 
U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
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moval of a possible incentive to future innovation does not necessary 
equate with removal of a patentholder’s essential benefits.  
 In sum, patents have some but not all of the characteristics of a 
federal benefit entitled to be considered property for purposes of the 
Due Process Clause. The benefit is clearly meant for the public good. 
It is established by a nondiscretionary statute, with only limited ex-
ceptions, and has an express duration that would create a reason-
able, objective expectation that the benefit will continue. However, 
the nature of patents leaves some doubt as to whether they fulfill 
some of the other requirements. Patents do not have an easily dis-
cernible value, because the value of each patent is dependent on the 
market for the patented technology. Moreover, because patents are 
not needed to furnish basic living requirements, they may not fall 
within the realm of “essential” federal benefits. Therefore, paten-
tholders should be aware that if courts were to begin to apply the 
Goldberg/Roth analysis to patents, there is significant doubt that 
patents would be entitled to due process protection. 
V.   THE ABILITY OF PATENTHOLDERS TO USE DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTION TO INVALIDATE IMPINGING GOVERNMENT ACTION 
 Theoretical consideration of the status of patents as property 
aside, what aggrieved patentholders care about is whether due proc-
ess claims would be a viable response to government action. To ad-
dress this issue, one should keep in mind that the Due Process 
Clause, meant to protect against arbitrary government action,121 cre-
ates two discrete requirements that must be satisfied: procedural due 
process and substantive due process.122 The requirement of “proce-
dural due process” is meant to ensure that, before the government 
impairs a person’s life, liberty, or property, there is a fair decision-
making process; the requirement of the “substantive due process” is 
                                                                                                                     
No. 7552, 2000); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Re-
search and Developments 783-820 (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activities No. 3, 1987)). 
 121. Id. at 845. “We have emphasized time and again that ‘[t]he touchstone of due 
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government . . . .’ ” Id. 
(quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). The Lewis Court stated that due 
process principles “ ‘were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of 
the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and 
distributive justice.’ ” Id. (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)). 
 122. Id. at 840. 
Our prior cases have held the provision that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const., 
Amdt. 14, § 1, to “guarante[e] more than fair process,” Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997), and to cover a substantive sphere as well, ”bar-
ring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures 
used to implement them,” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); see 
also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (noting that substantive due 
process violations are actionable under § 1983). 
Id. 
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meant to strictly limit a government’s ability to interfere in certain 
fundamental aspects of life, liberty, or property, regardless of 
whether the process justifying such interference is fair. Both are in-
tended to prevent government officials “ ‘from abusing [their] power, 
or employing it as an instrument of oppression.’ ”123 In recognition of 
each government branch’s differing roles and methods of functioning, 
each branch of government must satisfy different requirements to 
comport with due process.124 
A.   Claims Asserted by Patentholders Deprived of Patent Value 
Through the Government’s Unauthorized Use of the Invention 
 As explained earlier, the Due Process Clause directly provides in-
junctive relief.125 Unauthorized government use of a patented inven-
tion is not likely to create a viable substantive due process claim, but 
it may create a successful procedural due process claim. If so, the 
government may find itself enjoined from certain government con-
duct. 
1.   Substantive Due Process Claims 
 The Due Process Clause’s substantive due process requirement 
protects a person from impingement when the exercise of govern-
ment power does not serve a legitimate government purpose or there 
is no reasonable connection to that purpose.126 As a result, if a gov-
ernment action steps over the line by depriving a person of some as-
pect of life, liberty, or property without a sufficiently important pur-
                                                                                                                     
 123. Id. at 846 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 126). 
 124. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (legislative capacity); Ro-
chin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (executive capacities). With rare exceptions, judicial 
violations of due process are not likely to be relevant to patentholders’ claims. But paten-
tholders have occasionally successfully asserted due process violations claims regarding 
court action. See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1993) 
(holding that the Federal Circuit’s general practice of vacating declaratory judgments re-
garding patent validity following a determination of non-infringement “may unfairly de-
prive the patentee itself of the appellate review that is a component of the one full and fair 
opportunity to have the validity issue adjudicated correctly.”); Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. 
Wallace A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir. 1980). The Johnson & Johnson court 
noted that if a district court ordered a patentholder to submit his or her patent to the PTO 
and apply for a reissue patent prior to adjudication of the infringement action, then due 
process concerns would be triggered because there is no authority by which  
a district court, prior to a trial on the merits, can require a patentee to submit 
and surrender his patent right to the Patent Office as a condition to pursuing 
his remedies against an alleged infringer. If such power were authorized, it 
would be a taking of property without due process of law. 
Johnson & Johnson, 627 F.2d at 61. 
 125. See supra note 31. 
 126. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (emphasizing its re-
peated recognition that the substantive due process requirement prevents “the exercise of 
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental ob-
jective” (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986))). 
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pose, that person’s substantive due process right has been violated. 
No amount of process can shield a violative government action from 
being unconstitutional, and even the existence of procedures to rem-
edy the impingement is insufficient to avoid a violation. Particularly 
in the context of executive branch action, the Court has explained 
that, “the Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government 
officials ‘from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instru-
ment of oppression.’ ”127 Even more so than in the procedural context, 
the Court is hesitant to articulate a bright-line test for substantive 
violations.128 Nevertheless, the standard the Court has set is unques-
tionably high. Executive conduct will only be considered unconstitu-
tionally arbitrary if it is so “egregious” that it “shocks the conscience” 
of the court.129 The official conduct “most likely to rise to the con-
science-shocking level” is “conduct intended to injure in some way 
unjustifiable by any government interest . . . .”130  
 There are several obstacles that might prevent a patentholder 
whose invention has been used from succeeding on a substantive due 
process claim.131 The presence of section 1498 is legislative recogni-
tion of government use of patented inventions; as a result, it would 
seem likely that such use would constitute “justifiable government 
interest” so as to avoid “shocking the conscience” of a court.132 A find-
ing of a due process violation is particularly unlikely where the unli-
censed use is for military benefit, as was the case in Zoltek. Even 
though much of that use is in a non-emergency context in which the 
government could engage in licensing negotiations,133 it is not clear 
                                                                                                                     
 127. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 840 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 
503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992)).  
 128. Id. at 850.  
[O]ur concern with preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due 
process demands an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power 
is condemned as conscience shocking. . . . “The phrase [due process of law] for-
mulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other spe-
cific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a mat-
ter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts 
in a given case.” 
Id. (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)). 
 129. Id. at 846-47, 847 n.8.  
 130. Id. at 849. 
 131. In fact, research has uncovered only one instance in which a court has recognized 
a violation of a patentholder’s substantive due process right. In that case, the PTO was 
held to have violated substantive due process when an examiner rewrote claims to remove 
a certain aspect of the claimed invention, supposedly because the removal “clarifie[d] the 
issue.” In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1981). According to the Baxter court, this 
constituted a violation of substantive due process because “there [was] no basis in law for 
denial of patent rights merely because the denial ‘clarifies the issue.’ ” Id. 
 132. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (There is a “pre-
sumption that the administration of government programs is based on a rational decision-
making process that takes account of competing social, political, and economic forces”). 
 133. Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (government 
found to have infringed patent on protective ballistic eyewear); Parker Beach Restoration, 
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that the Due Process Clause obliges the government to do so. In an-
other due process case, the Supreme Court asserted that, “[i]n [a] 
proprietary military capacity, the Federal Government . . . has tradi-
tionally exercised unfettered control.”134  
 In sum, a patentholder facing unlicensed government use of his 
invention must demonstrate that the executive branch’s use “shocks 
the conscience” in order to success on a substantive process claim. 
Even where the government fails to provide compensation, it is likely 
to possess a “justifiable government interest” for that use that would 
likely preclude a court from finding a violation.  
2.   Procedural Due Process Claims 
 Whereas there appears to be little chance of a substantive due 
process violation, unauthorized government use may create a proce-
dural due process violation in some circumstances. Stated most sim-
ply, the Due Process Clause’s procedural protection ensures that a 
person receives “due process” when there is a government action that 
detrimentally affects any of his or her protected rights. This aspect of 
due process does not prevent government impairment of a right, as 
long as the rules of law are applied equitably: “ ‘[i]n procedural due 
process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally 
protected interest . . . is not in itself unconstitutional; what is uncon-
stitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process 
of law.’ ”135 That process is intended to guarantee that the person has 
an opportunity to present his or her argument against the govern-
ment action with the expectation that this opportunity to be heard 
would thwart an “arbitrary” deprivation.136 Thus, the executive 
branch violates procedural due process if it possesses legislatively 
authorized discretion but then fails to engage in sufficient process be-
fore exercising it.137 For example, when the PTO fails to follow regu-
                                                                                                                     
Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 126 (2003) (noting infringement by the Air Force of pat-
ented invention for mesh-net beach restoration device); AM Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 227 
Ct. Cl. 632 (1981) (government uses office copiers from competitor that infringes plain-
tiffs’ patents). 
 134. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961) 
(holding no due process violation resulting from a commander of a military installation’s 
decision summarily denying, for security reasons, a civilian employee of a private contrac-
tor access to the installation). 
 135. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
642-43 (1999) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). 
 136. In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 687 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“ ‘An elementary and fundamen-
tal requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” (quot-
ing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978))).  
 137. For example, assume that the law provides that the government may deny dis-
ability benefits to a person if it concludes, after proper process, that the person is suffi-
ciently healthy to perform many types of work. If the executive branch fails to engage in 
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latory procedures, a patent applicant may have a viable procedural 
due process claim.138  
 When it comes to government appropriation of an invention, there 
is no preemptive hearing or procedure in place. Section 1498 does not 
expressly authorize any challenge to such use; as explained earlier, 
that section only commands that “reasonable compensation” be pro-
vided when the government has done so. The absence of any proce-
dure prior to government use appears to provide ample argument for 
a procedural due process violation.  
 The question then becomes: what is the real danger of a proce-
dural due process claim? In most cases the government expects (or 
should expect) to pay section 1498 compensation, in which case an 
equivalent award on due process grounds would likely be unprob-
lematic. But a due process claim should be of greater concern when 
the government has expected to be in the unusual circumstance in 
which section 1498 does not apply (e.g., Zoltek).139 Even a monetary 
award may leave the government in a less than optimal situation, if 
the government did not properly compare the effect of unauthorized 
use to other available options (for instance, using a substitute prod-
uct). In such a case, however, the harm—though possibly dramatic—
is merely budgetary. More problematic would be the availability of 
                                                                                                                     
sufficient procedure prior to denying those benefits, the denied individual may have a vi-
able procedural due process claim.   
 138. Wm. T. Burnett & Co. v. Cumulus Fibres, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 734, 737 (W.D.N.C. 
1993) (noting that the patent examiner’s decision to expand the scope of the interference 
without providing the patent applicant its right to present evidence of patentability and/or 
amend its claims, as provided for in the patent regulations, violated procedural due proc-
ess); In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 687 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that the patent examiner’s 
failure to give the patent applicant proper notice of a modification to the examiner’s deci-
sion to narrow the scope of the patentable invention constituted a violation of procedural 
due process); In re Meyer, 599 F.2d 1026, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“Those cases [citing the 
above relationship between obviousness and novelty (anticipation)] do not provide a license 
for the board to shift the statutory basis of rejection from § 103 to § 102 while denying ap-
pellant the procedural due process provided for by 37 CFR 1.196(b).”). Though interest-
ingly, none of the claims brought by actual patentholders have been successful. See In re 
Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting patentholder’s claim that 
the PTO violated procedural due process by failing to provide a hearing, because the paten-
tholder “failed to satisfy a condition necessary to receive an oral argument,” and stating 
that “ ‘[a]n appeal decided without an oral hearing will receive the same consideration by 
the [Board] as appeals decided after oral hearing.’ ” (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.194(a) (1997))); 
Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam) (rejecting patentholder’s due process claim, because the PTO had no duty to indi-
vidually inform patentholders when their maintenance fees were due, so the PTO’s last-
minute reminder did not violate the patentholders’ due process rights).  
 139. It would be reasonable to suggest that use of the invention without compensation 
(as in Zoltek) might even “shock the conscience,” whereas use which includes providing 
compensation would not. If so, an uncompensated patentholder like Zoltek might suffer a 
cognizable substantive injury, whereas a compensated patentholder would not (even if the 
patentholder believes the compensation to be inadequate and would prefer to stop the use). 
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injunctive relief. Section 1498 does not allow for that form of relief,140 
but it is a common remedy sought in due process cases. This opens 
up the possibility of an injunction in the hands of a patentholder who 
is unwilling to license its product. Perhaps the patentholder has an 
exclusive agreement with another company or government; or per-
haps the patentholder is a foreign person or entity, and doesn’t wish 
to assist the United States government. If the patentholder is enti-
tled to obtain injunctive relief, it could seriously impair some estab-
lished government function—and, indeed, when dealing with mili-
tary hardware (as many section 1498 situations do), go so far as un-
dermining national security. While courts may not be obligated to 
provide injunctive relief rather than a monetary remedy, this compli-
cation may very well lead courts to scrutinize more carefully the need 
to offer patentholders due process protection. 
B.   Claims Asserted by Patentholders Deprived of Patent Value 
Through Amendments to the Patent Laws 
 Under most circumstances, the action affecting the greatest num-
ber of patentholders is an amendment to the patents laws. Rather 
than lessening the value of the few patents that may cover any one 
appropriated invention, such an amendment potentially diminishes 
hundreds, or thousands (or possibly even tens of thousands) of valid 
patents. These numbers expose the potency, and (on the flip side) the 
problem, of providing due process protection. For patentholders in 
this situation (unlike in the situation discussed in Part V.A), proce-
dural due process protection will not furnish a basis for relief. How-
ever, these patentholders may have a viable substantive due process 
claim when the claim is in response to retroactive, rather than pro-
spective, legislation. As a result, courts may choose to tread carefully 
in assessing whether such legislative action should entitle a paten-
tholder to any relief, whether injunctive or monetary. 
1.   Procedural Due Process Claims 
 The question of procedural due process generally does not arise 
when the government acts through its legislative process:  
                                                                                                                     
 140. See, e.g., Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (re-
jecting an argument that section 1498 permits the award of an injunction against an al-
leged infringer to prevent bidding on a government contract, explaining that “[t]he patentee 
takes his patent from the United States subject to the government’s eminent domain rights 
to obtain what it needs from manufacturers and to use the same. The government has gra-
ciously consented, in the same statute, to be sued in the Claims Court for reasonable and 
entire compensation, for what would be infringement if by a private person. . . . Though in-
junctions may seem to say that making for and selling to the government is [sic] forbidden, 
injunctions based on patent rights cannot in reality do that because of § 1498(a).” (empha-
sis added)).  
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General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the 
person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, 
without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are pro-
tected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by 
their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.141  
Consequently, patentholders whose patent value was negatively af-
fected by a law or regulation would have little chance of succeeding 
on procedural due process grounds. These patentholders may not al-
ways be without recourse, however. As discussed below, under some 
circumstances, substantive due process may provide the protection 
that they seek. 
2.   Substantive Due Process Claims 
 Not all interests mentioned in the Due Process Clause—life, lib-
erty, and property—are given equal levels of protection from legisla-
tive action. As a result, patentholders’ chances of success hinge on 
the level of protection the courts afford to patent rights. So-called 
“fundamental rights”—that include rights based on the concepts of 
personal autonomy and dignity, such as the right to marry, the right 
to reproduce, and the right to die (the “life” and “liberty” aspects)142—
receive the highest level of protection from government intrusion. 
Legislation impinging on these fundamental rights must survive 
“strict scrutiny”; in order to survive, the legislation must be narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling government interest.143 In contrast, 
economic rights are not considered to be fundamental rights. Courts 
have concluded that economic regulation most often involves an ex-
tremely complex policy balance of competing interests, and legisla-
tures presumably weigh those interests in formulating regulations.144 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); see At-
kins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) (discussing congressional decision to lower earned-
income deduction and declaring that the “ ‘legislative determination provides all the process 
that is due.’ ” (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1982)) (em-
phasis added)); 3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.8 (3d ed. 1999) (“When the legislature passes a law 
which affects a general class of persons, those persons have all received procedural due 
process—the legislative process.”); accord O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 
773, 784 (1980). 
 142. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (right to die); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to re-
produce); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (marriage and pro-
creation). 
 143. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (noting substantive due process protects “ ‘funda-
mental liberty interests’ ” from deprivation by the government, regardless of the proce-
dures provided, “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest”).  
 144. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) 
(“The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is 
for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new 
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As a result, legislatures “ha[ve] considerable leeway to fashion eco-
nomic legislation . . . .”145 Therefore “ ‘legislative Acts adjusting the 
burdens and benefits of economic life’ ” receive strong judicial protec-
tion.146 Not only are such acts given “a presumption of constitutional-
ity,” but the plaintiff must additionally establish that the legislature 
has acted in an “arbitrary and irrational way.”147 Legislation will 
survive this “rational basis” test so long as there is a legitimate gov-
ernmental goal and the legislation is rationally related to that goal. 
The government need not show “mathematical precision in the fit be-
tween justification and [the economic legislation].”148 Whether differ-
ent economic legislation would have been wiser “is not a question of  
constitutional dimension.”149 Unsurprisingly, only once has the Su-
preme Court found that economic legislation failed this test.150 
                                                                                                                     
requirement.”). It is certainly arguable that the lesser ability of property owners to influ-
ence the courts, as opposed to Congress, might lead to more equitable outcomes. But the 
propriety of the economic legislation standard is not the topic of this Article, and this paper 
does not attempt to wrestle with the question of whether the “rational basis” test applied 
to economic legislation is the most desirable one. 
 145. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528 (1998) (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Min-
ing Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 
(1986); Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension 
Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993)) (emphasis added).   
 146. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 637 (quoting Usery, 428 U.S. at 15). 
 147. Id.; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88; cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) 
(law should not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious). 
 148. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 637-41 (reviewing under substantive due process the 
imposition of liability on an employer for withdrawal from multiemployer pension fund); 
see Usery, 428 U.S. 1; Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 598-603 (1987) (reviewing under 
substantive due process a reduction in welfare benefits); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. 
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1985) (assuming without deciding that continued enrollment 
in a medical school program is a property interest protected by substantive due process); 
see Merrill, supra note 110. Cf. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invali-
dating various provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 as arbitrary, including a 
provision for employer-financed pensions for former employees who, though not in the em-
ploy of the railroads at the time of enactment, had been so employed within the year).  
 149. Usery, 428 U.S. at 18-19. 
We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress’ chosen scheme by examin-
ing the degree to which the “cost-savings” enjoyed by operators in the pre-
enactment period produced “excess” profits, or the degree to which the retro-
spective liability imposed on the early operators can now be passed on to the 
consumer. It is enough to say that the Act approaches the problem of cost 
spreading rationally; whether a broader cost-spreading scheme would have 
been wiser or more practical under the circumstances is not a question of con-
stitutional dimension. 
Id. (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963); Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488) 
(emphasis added); see also E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537 (“[T]his Court has expressed con-
cerns about using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation.”). 
 150. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582-83 (1996). “[A] reviewing court 
engaged in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive should ‘accord 
substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the 
conduct at issue.’ ” Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 
492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989)). Nonetheless, the court found that the “breathtaking” punitive 
damage award, which was 500 times the damage incurred, could not be justified on the 
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 No court has clearly decided whether patent rights should enter 
the pantheon of fundamental rights, or whether they constitute eco-
nomic rights. The Supreme Court often uses one of two phrases (or 
both) to describe the type of right entitled to that level of protection: 
either a right that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tra-
dition,” or one that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”151 
Patentholders might justifiably note that patent rights have existed 
almost since the country’s founding, and indeed the Framers even in-
cluded a call to establish such rights. There is little doubt, then, that 
such rights are deeply rooted in the country’s history and tradition. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to claim that patent rights are im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as the Court generally under-
stands it. First, a patent’s sole purpose is to provide monopoly prof-
its; patents do not actually give a person the right to do anything 
that they could not otherwise do. Second, the government could have 
chosen not to create patent rights. If they are implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty, then the Framers left open the possibility that 
Congress would fail to establish a crucial right. Third, unlike every 
established fundamental right, patent rights expire. After a patent’s 
established duration is over, the right ceases to exist. In sum, while 
patent rights have traditionally existed, they are not any more cru-
cial to personal liberty than other economic rights. At the end of the 
day, the decisive factor may be the Court’s stated hesitation to in-
crease the number of fundamental rights.152 In light of that disincli-
nation and the limited value of patents to a civilized society, it seems 
likely that patent rights will not be considered “fundamen-
tal rights.”153  
 Because patent rights are unlikely to get the elevated treatment 
of a “fundamental right,” a patentholder raising a substantive due 
process claim will have to demonstrate that the law was arbitrary 
and irrational. This is a high hurdle to satisfy, making it unlikely 
                                                                                                                     
ground that it was necessary to deter future misconduct. Id. Some argue that this distinc-
tion is inappropriate considering the importance of property rooted in the origins of our le-
gal system. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 
555 (1997) (noting the contrast between substantive due process protection of liberty and 
property and urging recognition of fundamental property rights). 
 151. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); accord County of Sacramento 
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
 152. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter, 
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process be-
cause guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and 
open-ended.” (citing Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26)). 
 153. Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Ab-
rogation of State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims Constitutional in 
Light of Seminole Tribe?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1507 (1999) (discussing whether state 
infringement of intellectual property could be a violation of substantive due process and 
observing that “it is unlikely that intellectual property is a ‘fundamental’ property interest 
in modern constitutional parlance”). 
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that patentholders will be able to demonstrate that any legislation 
prospectively eliminating or restricting their patent rights constitutes 
a violation of substantive due process. For instance, suppose that 
Congress approved legislation to eliminate remedies on future check 
collection patents. As long as the law was passed for a reason ration-
ally related to its effect, it would meet the requirements of substan-
tive due process.  
 However, not all patent legislation is prospective. Courts have 
traditionally applied the highly deferential standard to retroactive as 
well as prospective legislation,154 with court recognition that the 
“practicalities of producing national legislation” may justify imposing 
retroactive deprivation where it is “confined to short and limited pe-
riods.”155 Indeed, in the only Federal Circuit opinion considering leg-
islation with retroactive effect, Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, the court 
upheld a statute that permitted reexamination of all patents, includ-
ing patents issued prior to the statute’s enactment.156 But little 
should be presumed from the Patlex court’s analysis because its 
overall reasoning was flawed in ways that were clearly repudiated in 
a recent Supreme Court opinion.157 
 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has shown skepticism to-
wards retroactive economic laws, declaring that “a law that is fun-
damentally unfair because of its retroactivity is a law that is basi-
                                                                                                                     
 154. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537 (“[T]his Court has expressed concerns about using the 
Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation,” and thus “[t]o succeed, Eastern 
would be required to establish that its liability under the Act is ‘arbitrary and irra-
tional.’ ”). 
 155. Id. at 528; see United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1994). 
“Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legiti-
mate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the 
wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legisla-
tive and executive branches . . . .  
. . . [The] burden is met simply by showing that the retroactive application of 
the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.” 
Id. at 30-31 (quoting Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984)). 
 156. 758 F.2d 594, 603 (1985). The Patlex statute added a new post-issuance procedure 
permitting the PTO to reconsider whether the patent claims were properly granted. Id. at 
597. Although the statute was procedural in nature, the impact was certainly substantive. 
Because the post-issuance PTO hearing did not offer patents the same presumption of va-
lidity as the district courts, id. at 605, certain existing patents that might survive an inva-
lidity hearing in the court could have been invalidated (cancelled) by the PTO. 
 157. The Patlex court improperly examined the substantive due process claim by blend-
ing its due process analysis with a takings analysis, improperly reshaping the issue as a 
determination of “the nature and the magnitude of [the effect of the reexamination statute] 
on preexisting property values” and applying the Penn Central regulatory takings test. Id. 
at 602-03. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the Court expressly criticized the intermin-
gling of the due process analysis and the takings analysis. 544 U.S. 528, 540-42 (2005) 
(emphasizing that asking “whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving 
some legitimate public purpose” is different from “discerning whether private property has 
been ‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment”). 
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cally arbitrary.”158 While “legislation readjusting rights and burdens 
is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expecta-
tions,”159 legislation must be rational in light of its effect on settled le-
gal relationships.160 In the most recent case considering a retroactive 
law, both Justices Breyer and Kennedy emphasized that the goal of 
law is to ensure the stability of legal relationships, with Justice 
Breyer declaring that, “an unfair retroactive assessment of liability 
upsets settled expectations, and it thereby undermines a basic objec-
tive of law itself,”161 and Justice Kennedy emphasizing that, “[b]oth 
stability of investment and confidence in the constitutional system, 
then, are secured by due process restrictions against severe retroac-
tive legislation.”162 Justice Kennedy expressly suggested that retroac-
tive laws, that undermine legal relationships, are not deserving of 
the same presumption of constitutionality as other economic laws.163 
                                                                                                                     
 158. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 558-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see United States v. Carl-
ton, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) (noting that retroactive economic regulations are not tested un-
der a stricter standard—“whether ‘retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to 
transgress the constitutional limitation.’ . . . ‘does not differ from the prohibition against 
arbitrary and irrational legislation’ that applies generally to enactments in the sphere of 
economic policy.” (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938); Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984))). 
 159. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 
602, 637 (1993) (emphasis added).  
 160. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Unless it is fundamentally 
unfair and unjust, in terms of Eastern’s reasonable reliance and settled expectations, to 
impose that liability, the Coal Act’s ‘reachback’ provision meets that challenge.”). Of 
course, like many legal doctrines that determine reasonableness based on the party’s ex-
pectations, there is a substantial level of cause-and-effect—once the courts hold that a 
party did not have a reasonable expectation under the circumstances, other similarly-
situated parties could conclude that the courts would not find their reliance to be reason-
able. Until that first decision, however, those parties’ expectation would seem to be rea-
sonable. In this sense, it is much like the chicken-and-egg problem that exists with per-
sonal jurisdiction—whether it is foreseeable that a defendant would be subject to the juris-
diction of a particular court depends, in part, on earlier court decisions exercising or refus-
ing to exercise such jurisdiction. 
 161. Id. at 558 (“[T]o find that the Due Process Clause protects against . . . fundamen-
tal unfairness . . . of specially arbitrary retroactive [laws] is to read the Clause in light of a 
basic purpose: the fair application of law, which purpose hearkens back to the 
Magna Carta.”).   
 162. Id. at 549 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).  
Groups targeted by retroactive laws, were they to be denied all protection, 
would have a justified fear that a government once formed to protect expecta-
tions now can destroy them. Both stability of investment and confidence in the 
constitutional system, then, are secured by due process restrictions against se-
vere retroactive legislation. 
Id. 
 163. Id. Justice Kennedy in Eastern Enterprises stated “In our tradition, the degree of 
retroactive effect is a significant determinant in the constitutionality of a statute.” Id. (cit-
ing United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 32 (1994); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 
292, 296-97 (1981)). “If retroactive laws change the legal consequences of transactions long 
closed, the change can destroy the reasonable certainty and security which are the very ob-
jects of property ownership.” Id. at 548. The Court expressly “left open the possibility that 
legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited 
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But Justice Breyer was so discomfited that he implicitly endorsed the 
same notion, emphasizing that grounds that would save a prospec-
tive law might be insufficient to justify a retroactive law.164 As a re-
sult, a current patentholder might reasonably hope that the Supreme 
Court would agree with the only other uncovered due process case 
considering retroactive patent legislation—a district court case that 
found that such legislation violated the patentholder’s right to sub-
stantive due process.165  
 The section of the proposed Patent Reform Act of 2007 abolishing 
remedies for existing patents, thereby rendering them worthless, 
would seem to be of the type of retroactive amendment that the 
Court would find to unacceptably change the patent bargain. The 
settled legal relationship behind patents presumes that an inventor’s 
disclosure of the nature of his invention, along with information to 
enable its creation and use, is exchanged for patent protection. But 
this proposed section would leave the affected patentholders with no 
recourse when private financial institutions violate their patent ex-
clusivity—a patent exclusivity objectively estimated to be worth as 
much as $1 billion dollars.166 Thus if this legislation is indeed en-
acted, those patentholders can be expected to seek to either enjoin 
the enforcement of that provision or to recoup the diminished value 
from the government, through Bivens claims. An injunction would 
reestablish the availability of damages against the infringing private 
actors, thereby indirectly costing the public much of that amount as 
well as any indirect loss to the economy from the more expensive fi-
nancial transactions. More problematically for the government, a 
                                                                                                                     
class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability . . . .” Id. at 528 (majority opin-
ion). Justice Kennedy was unequivocal that, in that case, “[a]ccepted principles forbidding 
retroactive legislation” would have required invalidation of the statute. Id. at 547 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 164. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31.  
“To be sure, . . . retroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not faced by 
legislation that has only future effects. . . . The retroactive aspects of legisla-
tion, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and 
the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former . . . .” 
Id. (quoting Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984)). 
 165. Diebold, Inc. v. Record Files, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ohio 1953). In Diebold, 
Inc., the defendant in a patent infringement case asserted that certain patent claims were 
invalid. The defendant relied on the Patent Codification Act (PCA), which purported to 
disallow previously proper partial disclaimers of a patent, which would have thereby in-
validated many claims. Id. at 376 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 253). The PCA was apparently retro-
active and applied to all patents, not just subsequent filed ones. Id. The district court held 
that the act could only apply to patents in which “the facts giving rise to a new claim or de-
fense [in that case, the patent issuance, presumably] under the Act occurred after its effec-
tive date” and declared that applying the act to disclaimers filed earlier would violate sub-
stantive due process. Id. (“The constitutional principle of due process prohibits the retroac-
tive application of the new statute and a resultant invalidation of the plaintiff’s pat-
ent claims.”). 
 166. See CBO COST ESTIMATE FOR S. 1145, supra note 7, at 6. 
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damage award would avert those direct and indirect costs from in-
fringement actions, but at a very direct and considerable cost to the 
public coffers. While it is indeed the immensity of the loss itself that 
would motivate patentholders to seek relief, the possibility of such 
awards might encourage a court to reassess the obligation to provide 
patentholders’ with a right to such relief. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 There are more patentholders than ever who may seek relief when 
government action detrimentally affects the value of their patents. 
The expected explosion in patentholders’ due process claims creates a 
danger of enjoining government policy changes or crucial government 
use. Historically, courts have repeatedly characterized patents as 
“property” and thus accorded them protection under the Takings and 
Due Process Clauses. But patents are not another form of traditional 
property; rather, they are federally granted benefits. In light of the 
Federal Circuit’s recent repudiation of patentholders’ right to Tak-
ings Clause protection, and the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, 
it is fair to say that courts are no longer reflexively granting paten-
tholders property protection. If the courts choose to reconsider that 
protection, it would make sense for them to analyze patentholders’ 
rights to such protection using the same Goldberg/Roth test that is 
used to determine the due process rights of recipients of other gov-
ernment benefits.  
 Applying the Goldberg/Roth standard, there is substantial doubt 
as to whether patents satisfy the requirements for due process pro-
tection. Patents have some—but not all—of the characteristics of a 
protectible federal benefit. Unlike other federal benefits previously 
awarded protection, patents do not have an easily discernible value, 
because the value of each patent is dependent on the market for the 
patented technology. Moreover, because patents, unlike welfare, do 
not furnish basic living requirements, they do not fall within the 
realm of “essential” federal benefits. Thus, patentholders should be 
aware that if that standard is applied, there is some doubt that they 
will be entitled to due process protection. 
 Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s recent hesitation to accord patents 
full property status is easily understood in light of the potential im-
pact of the incumbent protections. Recognizing a patentholder’s right 
to due process protection could have a dramatic effect on government 
activities. Government action, either in the form of appropriation of 
an invention or in the form of legislation, may be susceptible to ei-
ther injunctive or monetary relief. If unlicensed use of an invention is 
found to violate due process, the government may find its use en-
joined, possibly making some of its most important government func-
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tions more costly or complicated. Similarly, the government may find 
the patentholders successful in either enjoining retroactive legisla-
tion or obtaining damages up to the value of the patentholders’ eco-
nomic loss—damages that, for currently proposed legislation, could 
be as high as $1 billion dollars. As such claims become more common, 
the danger is not simply that the government might be compelled to 
pay damage awards, but that such awards, or injunctions, might se-
verely hamper the government’s ability to make socially valuable 
changes to patent policy. Indeed, hesitation to create such a situation 
was suggested by the Zoltek Court’s finding that patents are not 
property for purposes of the Takings Clause. If courts hesitate to ac-
cede to these potential outcomes, they could choose to rely on the 
Goldberg/Roth test to reverse course and deny patentholders that 
particular protection. 
 In sum, while patentholders might view their right to due process 
protection as firmly established, the Federal Circuit’s recent Zoltek 
decision should give them pause. In circumstances involving gov-
ernment use of inventions or government policy changes, patenthold-
ers bringing such claims should expect caution from the courts in re-
affirming their right to due process protection. 
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